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German-Israeli relations

Many people in Israel viewed German reunification with scepticism. A look at German-Israeli relations since 1990.

22.06.2015

No one could take it for granted that Israel and the Jewish world would reconcile themselves to a reunified Germany. After all, most Jews regarded the division of Germany after the Second World War as just deserts for the crimes committed by the Nazis. Statements made by the then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir should also be interpreted accordingly: in November 1989, he expressed fears to an American television station that a reunified Germany could again be susceptible to fascism. His comments met with a stunned response from the foreign ministry in Jerusalem. During an in­formal meeting in Bonn, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl told the Israel’s Ambassador Benjamin Navon what he thought of this. In correspondence between Kohl and Shamir in early December 1989, Shamir, while not exactly taking back his words, did close with 
the following statement: “As prime minister of this state, it is my duty to express our doubts and our fears. Our views in this matter must by no means be interpreted in such a way as to jeopardise the relations that have been painstakingly developed over the years between ourselves and the Federal Republic of Germany.“ Initially, German reunification was likewise viewed critically by Great 
Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and by President François Mitterrand of France.

The sceptics were proved wrong, however. Under Foreign Minister Mosche Arens, Israel followed a pragmatic approach. During a 
visit to Bonn in February 1990, Arens expressed satisfaction about the fact that democracy was now being extended to include East Germany. Unofficially, it became clear that Israel was certainly shedding no tears over the collapse of the GDR, a country that had always been characterised by its hostile attitude towards Israel. Israel saw the widening of the democratic system into the GDR 
as a positive consequence of a process of unification that Israelis otherwise viewed with concern.

A rejection of reunification is not Israel’s official stance despite this opinion persisting for many years in left-wing intellectual circles. Members of the penultimate GDR government sought to exploit such sentiment in Israel when they attempted in early 1990 to accelerate negotiations for reciprocal recognition. The GDR saw reunification as a threat and tried to save itself with an attempt at diplomacy that appeared grotesque. The idea was for Israel of all places to help, the Jewish state riding to the rescue of a country that for decades had refused to acknowledge its historical responsibility and to pay reparations.

Although the process of unification proceeded more quickly than these sluggish negotiations, the newly elected People’s Chamber of the GDR decided on 12 April 1990 to take a historic step: for the first time, it accepted responsibility for the crimes of the Nazis and apologised for the GDR’s hostile attitude towards Israel. That said, there was no longer any chance of reparations being paid, as it was probable that the GDR would soon lose its economic and political ability to act. Nonetheless, a unique event in terms of protocol occurred in the Knesset: quasi-recognition on 26 June 1990 during a joint visit to Israel by Bundestag President 
Rita Süssmuth and People’s Chamber President Sabine Bergmann-Pohl. The two women travelled in different vehicles 
so as to display their separate national coats of arms and flags. Consequently, the flag of the collapsing GDR was flown several times in Jerusalem. This was no diplomatic farce but rather the symbolical recognition of a declining state as retrospective historical justification in a bid to make reunification more palatable for Israel.

Israel watched the first years of the unification process with concern. Looking back, this state of paralysis has entirely dissolved. This was due not only to the pragmatic lines followed by the foreign ministers Arens and David Levy, but also to the first Iraq war in 1991. German companies had exported chemical dual-use products to Iraq, thus increasing the risk of an Iraqi gas attack on Israel. The crisis overshadowed the feelings of resentment over reunification, and demanded that Germany make good on its promise to protect Israel. This later gave rise to the term “historical responsibility”. As Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel put it in a speech before the Knesset in 2008: “Every German government and every German chancellor before me has shouldered Germany’s special historical responsibility for Israel’s security. For me as German chancellor, therefore, Israel’s security will never be open to negotiation.”

Until the start of the new millennium, most of the crises of confidence were due to Israel being disappointed whenever economic benefits were allowed to overshadow Germany’s moral obligations. So far, the situation has been the reverse during crises in the 21st century: ever since the Oslo peace process began to falter, Israel’s behaviour towards the Palestinians has not corresponded to Germany’s expectations. The increased self-confidence of unified Germany following attainment of full sovereignty and the military operations in the Balkans and in the war against terror following 11 September 2001 have greatly eased the German dilemma over abstaining from the use of force.

It is not only that Israel had nothing to fear from a reunified Germany – an assessment of relations 50 years on is resoundingly positive. Germany is a reli­able partner on which Israel can count in the event of any existential threat. 
On a practical level, the situation is impressive: cooperation has been intensified and is of mutual benefit, be it in the areas of business, defence policy or high technology. The partnership is based on common interests and on give and take. What makes the relations between the two countries unique is the Shoah, or rather the memories of it, as a reason of state. It will be interesting to see how future generations deal with questions of memory and identity. The relationship is more than the sum of diplomatic relations, which is why it should not be allowed to become an elitist project. The more segments of civil society that are involved, the more lasting the partnership will be. ▪

Mordechay Lewy is a former Israeli ambassador, 
who was ambassador to the Holy See from 2008 to 2012. He completed several postings to Germany. In 
the post-reunification years of 1991 to 1994, he repre­sented Israel in Berlin as consul general. Today Lewy 
is taking a PhD at Goethe University Frankfurt.