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“Now cannot be understood without then”

Peace and conflict researcher Harald Müller discusses the lessons of history and the comparability of crises.

11.06.2014
© picture-alliance/dpa - Harald Müller

In Germany at the present time we are experiencing a veritable history boom surrounding the First World War – with books, film series, readings and articles. Did you expect this historical topic to attract so much attention and so much interest?

From the commercial perspective, yes, it was 
to be expected. It’s an 
ideal subject for best-sellers and blockbuster broadcasts: well-known, spectacular, historically 
significant and rather gruesome. So it’s a suitable topic not only for serious, intellectual debate, but also cryptic murmurings. Seriously, though, my seminar on the First World War is attended by 80 students who are obviously highly interested in the subject. They understand there’s a historical path from then to now, that now cannot be understood without then. And because they feel they know too little about it, they want to examine it more closely. I consider that a very mature attitude.

What message can we gain from a commemorative year like this with three big anniversaries – 1914, 1939 and 1989? What lasting impact could it have?

So far the First World War has dominated everything – it’s also the biggest anniversary. That’s why I assume its predominance will continue and the other jubilees will only become the focus of attention around the time of the anniversaries themselves – in September the beginning of the war in 1939 and in November the fall of the Wall in 1989. In Germany, discussion of the First World War will strengthen not only scepticism about the use of military force as a political instrument, but also the preference for a collaborative and multilateral foreign and security policy – in other words, the essential features of the Federal Republic’s external relations. The European ideal might also receive an urgently needed boost because the European Union is the strongest bulwark against a “new Sarajevo” in Europe.

The failure of diplomacy and the weakness of politics are invoked as reasons why the First World War could not be prevented. Does diplomacy have more effective instruments at its disposal today than it did 100 years ago?

There were then remnants of the Concert of Europe, a form of great power multilateralism which was highly effective for a long time and whose instruments were still used in 1913 during the Second Balkan War. The Leagues of Nations did not exist in 1914; it was only founded in response to the experience of war. Today the United Nations and its Security Council are a much stronger organisation that the League of Nations, but it needs to be complemented by a new Concert, whose membership – unlike that of the Security Council – reflects the balance of power in the world today. Ultimately, however, the existence of good institutions alone does not guarantee peace. They only offer opportunities, which need to be used. The action of the major powers is crucial. And that is where much is currently amiss, as is demonstrated equally by the crisis over Ukraine and the territorial disputes in East Asia and in the South China Sea.

Are 21st century points of friction and conflicts of interest fundamentally different from those of the 20th century?

They are alarmingly similar: territory, status, competition for a “place in the sun” and demand for raw materials – and secondarily also ideological conflicts such as democracy against autocracy. Everything else is less important. Although much has been written about it, globalisation has brought about only minor changes, and the same applies to the rise of non-governmental organisations. In terms of superpower relations, however, these are only external trimmings rather than substance.

The First and, above all, the Second World War have left their mark on the fundamental principles of the Federal Republic of Germany’s foreign policy. Is it possible to speak of “lessons learned” in this context?

The German population’s well-founded scepticism about the morality and cost-benefit ratio of military missions is based on the two world wars and has been largely confirmed – if not in every individual case – by the experience of mandated military interventions after 1990. The “lessons learned” are embodied in the willingness to engage in multilateral cooperation, the foundation of influence on economic strength, the aspiration for good neighbourly relations, the commitment to human rights, the preference for diplomacy over sanctions and threats, and the adherence to arms control and disarmament, even when they have gone out of fashion for some allies.

Now that Germany has been reunified for almost 
a quarter of a century it is expected to assume greater foreign policy responsibility. In what form can that be done?

The old Federal Republic assumed responsibility – within the EU, NATO and through the policy of detente. After 1990 that continued to be the case – in both non-militarily and military terms. No one should pretend that there are not 16 ongoing and 14 completed German foreign missions. Furthermore, in my opinion, the responsibility debate is one-sidedly focused on military questions. Areas in which Germany ought to assume greater responsibility include the fulfilment of United Nations Millennium Goals, climate policy or the realisation of greater economic and social equality within the EU and the world. In any event, I don’t consider Germany to have any outstanding debt in the military sphere.

If the European Union is one of the answers to the upheavals of the 20th century, was enough use made of the opportunities that presented themselves in Europe with the opening of 1989? Which opportunities were perhaps missed?

The deficits lie more at the European level. The NATO policy of enlargement cleared the way for a new division – this was probably unavoidable because of the pressing desire of the partners in Eastern Europe, but it is nonetheless tragic. The EU rightly opened itself towards the East, but allowed the enlargement to proceed too fast, instead of using enlargement as a reward for internal reforms.

Recently, Ulrich Beck, the sociologist, began an 
essay with the words: “Once upon a time there was a European dream that enemies would become friends.” If you were allowed to dream out loud, how would your European dream end?

I have given up dreaming about the European Union in terms of a final goal or objective. In the past it has always developed in cycles of setbacks followed by renewed leaps forward. Fundamentally, it can continue in that way. Strong national and weaker European identities can certainly coexist together, while strong institutions ensure survival and progress. Perhaps Eduard Bernstein’s adage about social progress also applies to the EU: “Progress towards the goal is everything, the final goal nothing.” ■

Interview: Janet Schayan

PROF. DR. HARALD MÜLLER

is Director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK) and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. His research areas include the security and international governance policy of states. Müller was disarmament adviser to Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the United Nations. He has been Co-Chairman of the Advisory Council on Peace and Conflict at the Federal Foreign 
Office since 1999 and Vice President of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium since 2011.